Putin's War, Week 129. The Invasion of Kursk Continues, Putin Unhappy, and the White House Befuddled



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Here we are, 905 days into Putin’s grand adventure in Ukraine. Just for laughs, let’s go back and see how the talking heads on Russian television predicted a war would go.

The big story remains Ukiraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast. While the overall goal of this invasion remains rather cloudy to me, it is clearly having some effects on the Kremlin.

The most important outcome may not be a good one for Ukraine. Allegedly, this is a level of military incompetence that Russian President Vladimir Putin can’t ignore. When you consider that no Russian military commander has been cashiered for the blazingly incompetent planning of the invasion or the conduct of the war, the fact that heads may roll in this case is astounding.

Why do I say this may not be good for Ukraine? If Putin fires enough people, it is theoretically possible that he will eventually find competent leadership somewhere in the Russian Army and promote it.

The invasion of Kursk has forced Putin to do something besides dismissing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It has raised the profile of the invasion and will require a Russian reaction. I recommend this tweet thread for some background. But the bottom line is that the invasion is an issue in Russia, and if Russia loses to an “inferior” people, what does this say about Russia?

There is no less confusion in Washington (or London or Berlin).

On the one hand, there has been no public statement indicating a demand by Washington for a Ukrainian withdrawal. Quite the contrary:

On the other hand, there is a fetishistic attachment to preventing the use of US weapons for deep strikes in Russia. The fetish is so strong it is nearly sexual in nature and makes otherwise arguably sane people say patently insane stuff.

Striking airbases inside Russia keeps Ukrainian cities much safer than shooting down the missiles they launch. Attacking supply depots inside Russia prevents those supplies from ever getting to the front, thereby increasing the chances of successful Ukrainian efforts to liberate occupied territory. 

Another story implies that Washington still doesn’t know what Ukraine is up to, or, in the words of the immortal poet, they are acting “Like their heads were on fire and their asses was catching.”

Unfortunately, the actions of Biden’s national security team make statements like this have the ring of truth in the same way the story of Biden betraying Mossad agents in Tehran sounds likely: see OPINION: Biden May Not Have Betrayed Mossad Agents to Iran, but the Proof It Didn’t Happen Is Lacking.

Indeed, the way the West responds in Ukraine will ultimately determine whether Europe and the world return to the “might makes right” system, in which small nations are party favors for larger ones.

Here are some of my past updates.

Putin’s War, Week 128. Russia Invaded – RedState

Putin’s War, Week 127. F-16s Arrive

Putin’s War, Week 126. Ukraine and Hungary Square Off, More Peace Talk by Putin, and the Escalation Flop – RedState

Putin’s War, Week 125. North Korea Sending Food to Russia Was Not on My Bingo Card

Putin’s War, Week 124. NATO Summit Meets and Putin Levels a Hospital

Putin’s War, Week 123. F-16s Wait in the Wings, More Weapons Arrive, and the Momentum Shifts – RedState

Putin’s War, Week 122. Zelensky Scores, Putin Flops, and Crimea Under Fire 

Putin’s War, Week 121. Putin Threatens, Zelensky Negotiates, and the White House Sends Lots of Missiles 

Putin’s War, Week 120. Zelensky Gets Security Agreement With the US and the Repo Man Comes for Russia

Putin’s War, Week 119.

Putin’s War, Week 118. Ukraine Gets a Green Light From Biden and France Nearly Has ‘Boots on the Ground’ 

For all my Ukraine War coverage, click here.

Politico-Strategic Level

New US Aid Package

Politico reports that Senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal are collaborating on a new Ukraine aid package. I’m sorry, but I don’t see it happening before the Biden grifters are cleaned out.

Attacks On Ukrainian Population Centers Continue

Trouble in Paradise

There is a train of argumentation on social media that says China and Russia are allies and work in tandem toward joint goals. This article provides one of the better descriptions of the theory, despite being nearly a decade old, and gives us an idea about the validity of that point of view. While I can see the attraction of the concept to a certain class of international relations majors, I don’t think it holds up. China doesn’t want to be an ally of Russia because of the vast power differential between them and they know what happened to Imperial Germany when it allied itself with Austria-Hungary. China knows that Putin could drag them into a war. Russia is a client state of China. It sells oil and gas to China at cut-rate prices, and it sells crap products to Russia because no one else will touch them. 

Read the whole thread; it is excellent.

Lukashenko Strives for Relevance

Belarus’s Grand Poohbah Aleksandr Lukashenko is desperately trying to give the impression of doing something to help Russia while doing nothing to convince the Poles that he’s worth the effort of thumping. One of the reasons Ukraine was able to invade Kursk Oblast is that Lukashenko moved his forces off the border, signaling that he would not invade Ukraine. This freed up Ukrainian units that had been frozen in place to defend against a possible Belarusian attack.

Contracts On Pro-Ukrainian Social Media Accounts?

There is no doubt that pro-Ukriane social media accounts have done a lot to solidify public support for Ukraine, push back on Russian propaganda, and raise money for Ukrainian military units. Allegedly, the FSB has taken notice and asked for permission to take them out. 

Conceptually, I don’t find this surprising at all. The Kremlin goes after its enemies in a very serious manner. Given the increasing profile of the FSB in this war — an FSB general now runs the operation in Kursk — I don’t dismiss this out of hand. 

It Was NATO

One of the ongoing Russian narratives about Putin’s War is that every setback suffered by Russian arms is at the hands of NATO, particularly Brits or Poles. The reason is pretty simple. Russian is willing to admit being beaten by Western powers, but if it admits Ukraine can kick its ass, then the glue holding together the increasingly fragile Russian Federation becomes much weaker. This is the latest version of that narrative.

Irony Is Dead and Composting in the Cabbage Patch

I’m Sorry, Sir, This is Wendy’s

Listen to Them When They Tell You What They are Doing

As I’ve said many times, it is easy to ignore these people because they sound like guys who didn’t make the cut to be Bond Villains. We need to keep in mind that these are perceived as serious people in Russia; they are speaking on Russian state television, they are mouthing words that the regime has approved, and their purpose is to tell the Russians what to believe. When they tell us that Russia’s boundaries are the ocean, we should probably give them the respect of acknowledging that what they are saying does not sound strange in Russia and that it has the approval of the Kremlin.

Operational Level

The situation for this 129th week remains largely stable. Russia has eeked out small gains in Donbas, but they seem more like an effort to reach the administrative boundaries of Donetsk and Luhansk, allowing those oblasts to be declared 100% under Russian control than they seem focused on creating a tactical or operational breakthrough. 

What is notable is that the number of reported air strikes has declined since the invasion. This, I think, indicates that the Russian Air Force is finally feeling the spare parts pinch. We are overdue for a serious Russian missile attack, and every day that passes is an indication that the resources for the large 100-missile attacks we’ve seen in the past don’t exist. The number of reported Russian ground and MLRS has also declined. To me, this indicates troops and equipment being moved to Kursk.

There is something of an online pee-pee measuring contest going on on the subject of Russian troops being diverted from Occupied Ukraine to Kursk. CNN reported this is happening; see Russia appears to have diverted several thousand troops from occupied Ukraine to counter Kursk offensive, US officials say | CNN Politics.)

The Financial Times’s guy says it isn’t happening.

Bertrand is nothing if not a faithful transcriptionist for the US Intelligence Community, perhaps only exceeded by Ken Delanian. I have to believe that is what she was told, and I think her credibility is too valuable to the IC for them to burn her. The Financial Times hasn’t been terribly accurate when reporting on the war. Finally, I posted a video last week of Russian troops leaving Donbas for Kursk. Now we have even more video.

This kind of public appeal also increases the chances of Russia sending more troops to Kursk.

I think the video evidence and the numbers of infantry and rocket attacks all indicate that Russian troops are being moved from Occupied Ukraine to Kursk.

Of course, the big puzzle is what is going on in Kursk. As I see it, there are three possible objectives. Two of those are strategic, and one is operational.

The logical operational objective is to cut through Russian territory and threaten the Russian forces operating in northern Kharkiv with envelopment from the rear. As you know from the map in the “Russian Front” sector, the Ukrainians have dropped one or two bridges — the reporting is muddled — over the Seym River. While this may result in the encircling of all Russian forces south of the river, a strong case can be made that this move, along with artillery and drones, secures the Ukrainian left flank from any Russian attack. This would free up forces to press the attack on the Ukrainian right flank and threaten the troops in Kharkiv.

That’s the best I can come up with for a concept that supports an operational objective. The least likely objective is to grab a chunk of Russia and hold it as a bargaining chip. The logic goes like this. Kursk’s population has a small number of ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian language speakers. Ukraine could grab that area and hold it under the guise of protecting Ukrainians and use it as a bargaining chip to trade for Russian evacuation of parts of Occupied Ukraine. I don’t see how this works. Claiming to protect Ukrainians and then bargaining them away is not a great political move. Plus, it draws resources away from the main battle.

Ukriane’s most likely course of action is — again, this is my opinion — to operate in the area until serious numbers of Russian troops appear, then conduct a very publicly announced orderly, fighting retreat that kills as many Russians as possible and destroys all the public infrastructure in the occupied area of Kursk.

It is critical for Ukraine that this operation be viewed as a success, and that can only happen once Ukraine tells us what it is doing.

Refugee Hotline

This hotline is working in tandem with Ukrainian forces to distribute food and humanitarian supplies to civilians in liberated Kursk.

Railroad Collapse

I posted last week about the difficulties facing Russian railroads and the director of Russia’s railway system threatening to put failed bureaucrats up against the wall. The problem may be worse than I’d thought.

Not a Learning Army

I usually show Russian talk show videos to mock the participants. This time is different. This is the Russia 1 show, “Vesti.doc,” hosted by Putin’s favorite, Olga Skabeyeva. The specific subject is the Russian convoy en route to Kursk that was hit by a HIMARS strike while at a half and as many as 1,000 casualties may have resulted. I have no idea who her guest is, but he makes many of the points that I’ve made for 30 months. The long and the short of it is that Russia has not been at war with Ukraine for 30 months. It has been at war with Ukraine for one month 30 times.

He says commanders and troops still use messaging apps that are routinely intercepted by Ukrainian forces. Convoys don’t observe basic discipline. He blames the West and floats the idea of shooting down US reconnaissance drones operating over the Black Sea (see Putin’s War, Week 55. Russia Drops US Recon Drone, Ukraine Suffers From ‘Loose Lips’ as It Doubles Down on Bakhmut – RedState), but he hits the nail on the head. “Again,” he says, “all the enemy’s successes are not because the enemy is super-smart, but because we make the same mistakes over and over again.”

So when you read stories like Russia’s army is learning on the battlefield (economist.com), you are reading a substantial amount of bullsh**. The Russian Army does not have a noncommissioned officer corps to collect and pass on techniques. It doesn’t rotate experienced men out of the field to train conscripts; it leaves them in place until they die. To the extent the Russian Army has learned, it is at echelons that don’t suffer from combat attrition.

Help Wanted

I Had a Great Burrito Today

A few months ago, I reported on an American defector going missing in the Donetsk People’s Republic; see Putin’s War, Week 112. Ukraine Funding Passes and ATACMS Hit Crimea – RedState. Russell Bentley was a Putinista in the mold of several social media personalities like David Sacks and some commenters here at RedState. He moved to Donbas and fought for Russia during the 2014 war. The full story is in this thread:

New Weapons

Robot Dogs

Combat Operations

Platoon Attack

This attack occurred at Spirne, north of Bakhmut, near the administrative border between Donetsk and Luhansk. It involves a platoon of Russian mechanized infantry. The Russians attack in two waves.

If you aren’t interested in the whole video, this thread has clips and descriptions.

Clearance Operations in Kursk

I’m trying to parse out Kursk-related items to hold for my next “Russia Invaded” update, but I decided to make an exception for this one. For what it’s worth, I have yet to encounter anyone from an Allied Special Operations Forces community who thinks the Spetsnaz, particularly the FSB variety, is much more than a joke.

More Attacks on Ukrainian Positions

This video is from the Russian side and shows a BM-21 rocket launcher unit conducting preparatory fires for the Russians in the above video.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Machinegun Training in the Second Most Powerful Army in Ukraine

Whatever Works

Discipline is Not Bondage

This is video of Russian troops undergoing field punishment for some infraction.

It is a matter of time until the Russian Army discovers the time-honored technique of “fragging.”

Russian Front

Kursk

I plan to start weekly updates on the Kursk offensive because a) there is a lot of information to cover, and b) these updates are already challenging the attention span of some of my readers. My first Kursk update is at Russia Invaded, Week 1. The State of Play. I am going to drop a couple of items in here just to keep you up to date.

Early reports suggested that parts of the Ukrainian Army crossed the frontier disguised as Russian troops. Given the great degree of commonality in equipment and language and the Russian troops being largely untrained conscripts, this seemed plausible. Apparently, it was not only plausible but so effective that it is continuing with Ukrainian troops playing the role of Russian reinforcements.

The major tactical change is in the northwest area, where the main bridge over the Seym River has been dropped. The Russian Army in that area is dependent on two low-capacity bridges and a ribbon bridge near the site of the dropped bridge. This will create an interesting operational problem for the Russian commander in the area over the next week.

Air Mobile Operation

This is the Ukrainian Army conducting a platoon-sized airmobile operation. Given the circumstances, it appears to be more of an aerial movement to link up with friendly forces, but it is telling that this is possible.

According to Russian Telegram posts, the operation was more extensive than we see here.

Northern Front

Kharkiv

Hlyboke-Vovchansk

There is no change to the front line.

Kreminna-Kupyansk-Svatove

There were minor Russian gains, but the front line remains stable and unchanged.

Donbas

The most troubling area on the Donbas front remains the northern rim of the old Avdiivka Salient. That area lost cohesiveness during a relief-in-place operation and has never recovered. That weakness has drawn nonstop Russian attacks.

The area is of particular concern because, unlike the area west of Bakhmut, a penetration here could give the Ukrainian command some anxious moments. So far, the Russians have been satisfied with chipping away at the front line and haven’t tried to put together a major operation.

Southern Front

Zaporizhzhia

No reported activity in this area. The front line remains stable.

Kherson

No reported activity in this area. The front line remains stable.

Rear Areas

Crimea

Oil Platform

Russia

Massive Airbase Attack

Oil Depot, Proletarsk, Rostov Oblast

Air Defense Operations

It is hard to determine whether this is accurate, but here it is.

Chkalovksy Airbase, Moscow Oblast

There have been no reports on the outcome of this attack.

What’s Next

In my view, three things have to happen in the next four weeks. First, Ukraine has to bring the Kursk operation to a climax and wind it down. I don’t see how an occupation of a big slice of Kursk is ever anything but a sideshow, and we’re not seeing the combat power developing there to threaten the Russian forces operating in Kharkiv. The longer that operation goes on, the greater the risk of it going pear-shaped. The second thing that has to happen is Ukraine has to stop the Russian offensive in Donetsk. While not a threat, and even though it may be killing a lot of Russians, it gives the impression that Russia still has the initiative and is driving the train. The third thing that has to come together is a credible Ukrainian attack that regains Ukrainian territory. While militarily, this may not be a huge priority, it is politically, particularly if Donald Trump wins in November. I’m not alone in holding that thought.



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