It is safe to say that Week 128 of Tsar Vladimir’s Great Adventure is not shaping up the way he visualized it. As I write this, the Ukrainian Army has seized about 300 square miles of Kursk Oblast. The fun doesn’t seem to be over yet. I’ll have more to say about that later in the post.
One of the interesting things about Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast is that it was pretty obvious that the Biden national security apparatus was caught with its Depends down. You don’t publicly admit you must call someone to get “clarification” about what is happening if you were told. This has overtones from other incidents. We know that the Biden national security cucks have been kept in the dark by Israel. And we know from my post last week (Putin’s War, Week 127. F-16s Arrive) that Andrey Bulousov, Russia’s newly minted Defense Minister, placed a personal call to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to complain about some activity Ukraine was allegedly planning.
The evidence is that Ukraine planned a series of attacks on Russian military bases to coincide with Russia’s “Navy Day.” While Russia knew about the planned attacks, Austin didn’t.
The message is clear. Our national security policy is in the thrall of Jake Sullivan and the “oh, my gosh, that could mean ESCALATION!!1!1!” crowd. Israel and Ukraine know that if they share sensitive information with the US, that information will be shopped to their enemies because Sullivan is fresh out of brown trousers.
Another notable feature of the Ukrainian incursion is that there is no happy talk coming from the Kremlin about immediately clearing the Nazis from Russian soil.
Here are some of my past updates.
Putin’s War, Week 127. F-16s Arrive
Putin’s War, Week 126. Ukraine and Hungary Square Off, More Peace Talk by Putin, and the Escalation Flop – RedState
Putin’s War, Week 125. North Korea Sending Food to Russia Was Not on My Bingo Card
Putin’s War, Week 124. NATO Summit Meets and Putin Levels a Hospital
Putin’s War, Week 123. F-16s Wait in the Wings, More Weapons Arrive, and the Momentum Shifts – RedState
Putin’s War, Week 122. Zelensky Scores, Putin Flops, and Crimea Under Fire
Putin’s War, Week 121. Putin Threatens, Zelensky Negotiates, and the White House Sends Lots of Missiles
Putin’s War, Week 120. Zelensky Gets Security Agreement With the US and the Repo Man Comes for Russia
Putin’s War, Week 119.
Putin’s War, Week 118. Ukraine Gets a Green Light From Biden and France Nearly Has ‘Boots on the Ground’
Putin’s War, Week 117. Jake Sullivan Under Fire, ATACMS Everywhere, and the Stalemate Continues
For all my Ukraine War coverage, click here.
As always, I have to credit Colonel (retired) Mike Ford, the Most Interesting Colonel in the World, for the discussions that help frame this update.
Politico-Strategic Level
Railroads Facing Collapse?
Railroads are indispensable to supplying Russia’s war effort in Ukraine and the more mundane task of holding an increasingly fractious Russian Federation together. A story surfaced earlier in the week that the deputy director of Russian Railways, Sergei Kobzev, said that Russian railways are on the cusp of a complete collapse and he needed people to get off their asses and get to work.
I’m not going to debate whether this is true. I’ll just say the guy sharing it has a high accuracy rating, and his credibility is tied up in being right. What is unquestionable is that it fits in with other data points. Russia is dependent upon black market parts to keep its railways functional. The number of known rail accidents in Russia is increasing, and the volume of rail traffic is decreasing.
None of this should be a big shock to anyone.
This is similar to what we are seeing with Russian aviation. That industry now relies on black market imports to keep aircraft operational. This inevitably results in substandard components entering the supply chain (see Russian Il-76 cargo jets grounded due to substandard bearings). Downtime and accidents increase.
The Russian air and rail networks are buckling due to a lack of maintenance, skilled workers being conscripted, a lack of quality parts, and overstretched. The Russian railway system probably won’t collapse in a matter of days, but the end is in sight.
Smartphones Banned
I have to admit being astonished at the troop-level video that appears online. Russia has acted to shut down this flow of information that not only harms Russia’s “special military operation” narrative but provides invaluable intelligence to the Ukrainians. I don’t know why a law is needed when you allegedly have a chain of command, but I’m not Russian, so some things remain a mystery to me.
Unclear on the Concept
A Danish vatnik enlisted in the Russian Army and is disappointed to find himself in combat.
The Meatgrinder Demands Feeding
Peak Russia
Operational Level
The big operational story is the Ukrainian invasion of Russia. I have a lot of stuff on that below, but the main takeaways are: 1) the Ukrainians achieved tactical, operational, and strategic surprise; 2) they have managed a mechanized force in a creditable fashion; and 3) the Russians have failed to respond.
Despite the invasion, the number of reported Russian airstrikes did not spike, which speaks to aircraft availability. Russian missile attacks remained in the single digits. However, we are coming to a window when we can expect a large missile attack. If another week goes by without such an attack, we are looking at something significant.
Another interesting effect is that the number of reported Russian ground assaults has dropped 30 percent since the Ukrainian invasion. This number does not include combat actions in the new Russian Front area.
Combat Operations
Failed Company-Sized Assault
This engagement occurred southwest of Bakhmut. It involved about a company of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that were broken up by antitank mines, drones, antitank weapons, and artillery.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Drone Engineers
The use of drones is slowly revolutionizing warfare. We’ve seen them used for reconnaissance, attacking targets, moving up supplies, and evacuating wounded. This is the first video I’ve seen of drones bringing up building materials.
Air-To-Air Combat
A Ukrainian FPV narrowly misses a Russian Mi-28 helicopter.
More FPV vs helicopter video shows this has stopped being a novelty.
I really had no idea that drone-to-drone combat was so common. This is a mashup of Ukrainian FPV drones taking on and taking out relatively expensive (by drone standards) Zala recon drones.
Crude and Possibly Effective
An FPV drone is pursuing a Russian utility vehicle. The Russian in the back starts throwing the contents out under the illusion that it will increase the vehicle’s speed. The kicker: the truck is carrying dead Russians.
Russian Front
Cue the mood music.
Kursk Operation
I posted yesterday on the Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
BACKGROUND: Ukraine’s Surprise Invasion of Russia Leaves Putin With the Stunned-Mullet Look
This is what the front lines looked like yesterday.
This is a good approximation of today.
The Ukrainians seem to be sealing off their right flank and focusing on increasing the penetration.
We still don’t know what the Ukrainian objective is in this invasion. It has certainly got the attention of the Kremlin. It requires diverting Russian forces from other areas to deal with it. However, note that you aren’t seeing railcars with tanks heading to Kursk. You are seeing thin-skinned vehicles and light infantry being sent to stop a mechanized force. Inevitably, this will create operational opportunities for Ukraine in other areas. The open question is what sort of strategic reserve Ukraine has to take advantage of the opportunity.
Here is video of a Russian relief column hit by Ukrainian HIMARS. What is illustrative about this attack is that they hit a moving column with a GPS-guided round. That shows a high level of proficiency.
There are reports of several hundred Russian prisoners taken.
We are seeing video of Russian units pulled out of the line and shipped to stop the attack in Kursk. The tweet makes a good point about the preponderance of civilian vehicles in the column. Having had some experience in military convoys, I’d also point out that, best casing it, a unit deployed from somewhere in Donetsk to the Kursk fighting is looking at a 500-mile motor march. That will take about 20 hours when you factor in stops, refueling, etc. The attrition rate is going to be horrendous. I’d expect them to lose half of the military vehicles enroute unless they’ve had stellar maintenance since they first deployed to Ukraine. They are going to lose a lot of the commandeered civilian vehicles, too.
Northern Front
A note on the maps. The invasion of Russia has had the same effect on map makers as a laser pointer has on a cat. This week, the maps will be presented in groups. You’ll note the vast discrepancy between “Russian sources claim” and proof of advances. I’m sure that has nothing to do with the situation in Kursk.
Kharkiv
Hlobane-Vovchansk
Fighting continues in the area. Neither side made measurable gains.
Kupyansk-Kreminna-Svatove
The Russians launched several attacks in this area. The line remains unchanged.
Donbas
Bahkmut-Klishchiivka-Andriivka
Russian operations continued in this area. The Russian offensive at Chasiv Yar remains stalled, but I would say it has definitely culminated. Small advances were made in the town of Niu York, but the front line remained unchanged.
Avdiivka
This area continues to be the vulnerable point of the Ukrainian defensive line. Last April, a botched relief-in-place operation nearly resulted in a Russian breakthrough (see Putin’s War, Week 113: US Aid Arrives Just in Time, and a Russian Attack Nearly Turns Into a Breakthrough). Since then, the Ukrainian units in that area have struggled to regain their footing. This week, they continued to give ground. The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast may be the saving grace as it will be difficult for Russia to keep pressure on here and try to repel the liberators, I mean invaders.
Southern Front
Zaporizhzhia
Robotyne-Verbove- Novoprokopivka
The lines have remained unchanged.
Kherson
The front lines in this area remain static.
Raid on Kinburn Spit
At least six Russian vehicles were reported destroyed, and about 30 Russians were killed in this raid.
Rear Areas
Crimea
Kilo-Class Sub Destroyed
The Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don was heavily damaged in a Storm Shadow attack last September; see Ukrainian Attack on Russian Fleet Leaves One Ship and One Sub Destroyed With No Nuclear War.
Russia
Morozovsk Airbase
I posted on this strike last week (Putin’s War, Week 126. Ukraine and Hungary Square Off, More Peace Talk by Putin, and the Escalation Flop). Now, we have some imagery to go along with the story.
What’s Next
While Ukraine faces the same challenges I covered in my last post, the invasion of Kursk Oblast has made the job easier. In one move, I think we can fairly say that Ukraine regained the initiative. What Russia does now will be a reaction to what Ukraine does.
In my Thursday post on the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is quoted as saying that one of the offensive’s goals was to convince Russia to come to the negotiating table. This move has to have rattled the Kremlin, but whether it rattled it that much remains to be seen.
This offensive has demonstrated to NATO that Ukraine can do something besides plow headlong into a minefield. That will go a long way toward the drift toward pessimism about Ukraine’s prospects in Europe. Given the silence of the Putin-fellatistos and “Russia isn’t even trying yet” accounts that haunt my comments section, I have to conclude that they are having their own crisis of confidence.
Ukraine also needs to keep its eye on the ball and not let “irrational exuberance,” to coin a phrase, turn a very successful operation into a bloody muddle. The Ukrainians should create their own version of “make Georgia howl.” On the way out, they should leave Occupied Kursk in such a condition that “a crow would be compelled to carry his own rations” to cross over that territory.
In my view, Ukraine still has to put up a win somewhere in Ukraine before the fighting season ends. As important as it is, this incursion is not liberating territory or setting the conditions to liberate territory.
